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JAMES van R. SPRINGER *

The United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards t
This paper deals with a situation that is, fortunately, rare in the
arbitration of private international business disputes. Most parties to
contracts providing for arbitration do not try to circumvent their
agreements to arbitrate when an actual dispute arises, and accept the
results of the arbitration to which they have agreed. But some do not,
and sometimes judicial assistance is necessary to make private arbitration work. Obviously the availability of such assistance is an essential
underpinning for effective arbitration.
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is a major effort in this area of making
private agreements to arbitrate stick internationally. As those familiar
with its history know, the Convention-while a short one-deals with a
complex subject that has in the past been subjected to a good deal of
controversy. Much could be said about the subject, but there is room
here only for a relatively superficial survey of the Convention and its
relationship to United States law.
It is now just a little more than ten years since the Convention was
formulated at the UN Conference on Commercial Arbitration in New
York in May and June of 1958. The United States-because of the then
current Bricker Amendment problems, and also because of a now
somewhat antiquated distrust of arbitration-was an unenthusiastic and
* JAMES van ROVEN SPRINGER, Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.; graduate of Harvard College (A.B.) and Harvard Law School (LL.B.);
formerly, Assistant Legal Advisor for Economic Affairs, Department of State (196 7-1968) and
Associate with the firm of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. (1962-1967).
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States
largely inactive participant in the Conference. The United
1
delegation recommended against signature of the Convention.
Interested private groups took a different view. The ABA
International Law Section's Committee on International Unification of
Private Law made a detailed study and recommended accession to the
Convention accompanied by changes in the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925 to implement accession. 2 In September 1960, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted a resolution putting forth this recommendation. In
1967, the American Arbitration Association passed a resolution also
urging United States accession, and also collected an impressive list of
individual supporters. In due course, these urgings and those of others
in the private sector had their effect, and on April 24, 1968 the
President, at the request of the Secretary of State, transmitted the
Convention to the Senate for advice and consent to United States
accession .3

The Senate has not yet acted, and the matter may have to be
carried over to the next Congress, but Senate approval is expected.
Implementing legislation, which is considered necessary before the
United States can actually accede to the Convention, will be submitted
to the Congress after the Senate consents to the Convention. There is
good reason to expect that in 1969 the United States will join the 34
present members of the Convention, which include France, Germany,
Japan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, India, the U.S.S.R. and much
of Eastern Europe.4 United States accession could be expected to
encourage other nations to join.
The Convention is not a panacea, and it creates substantial
problems of both interpretation in itself and application to United
States law. Nonetheless, the Convention-if it is widely ratified-will
significantly benefit international commerce by permitting the parties
to international business transactions to provide more efficient and
predictable means for the settlement of disputes and, to a very
I The members of the U.S. delegation were W.T.M. Beale, Jr. (Chairman), Edmund F.
Becker, John J. Czyzak, Seymour M. Finger, and Charles H. Sullivan.
The problems that two members of the delegation saw are reflected in Czyzak & Sullivan,
American ArbitrationLaw and the U.N. Convention, 13 ARB. J. 197 (1958).
2 The Committee's report was published in mimeographed form in May 1960.
3 Executive E. 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 The other members are Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Ceylon,
Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Madagascar, Morocco,
Niger, Norway, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2

322

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

significant extent, to agree upon the substantive and procedural law
that will govern them.
I. The Provisions Of The Conventions

1. Coverage
The title "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards" is actually a misnomer, since the Convention
covers not only the enforcement of arbitral awards but also the very
important matter of giving effect to agreements to arbitrate existing
and future disputes. To some extent, the latter aspect of the
Convention was an afterthought, a fact that shows up in the problems
mentioned below about the scope and meaning of the provisions on
agreements to arbitrate.
At least as to the enforcement of awards, the scope of the
Convention is relatively clear: Article I states that the Convention
applies to "awards made in the territory of a State other than the State
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought."
The Convention applies only to arbitration to which the parties have
agreed, and not to any compulsory arbitration.
This broad coverage is subject to limitations. Article 1(3) provides
that a State may "declare that it will apply the Convention to...
awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State." The
President proposes to make this reservation for the United States, and
the major existing adherents have also done so. Article 1(3) permits a
state also to "declare that it will apply the Convention only to ... legal
relationships ...considered as commercial" under its law, and the

United States, again like a substantial number of the other parties, also
proposes to make this declaration. Finally, Article XIV provides for
general reciprocity: a State can invoke the Convention only to the
extent that it is bound by it. The final act of the Conference (but not
the Convention itself) states that no further reservations are to be
permitted; although the legal efficacy of this prohibition is dubious, no
state has yet made additional reservations, and the United States does
not propose to do so.
The limitation of coverage to matters considered "commercial"
under the laws of the various states creates a potential element of
5 For another survey of the Convention's provisions and related problems, see Quigley,
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2

UN Convention on Recognition of ArbitralAwards

323

uncertainty; in particular, it creates a problem in drafting implementing
legislation for the United States, discussed below.
2. Enforcement of Awards
Article III of the Convention requires contracting states to enforce
foreign arbitral awards that come within the scope of Article I "in
accordance with (their) ... rules of procedure." Article IV makes it
explicit that in order to obtain enforcement, the victor in the
arbitration has only the burden of introducing authentic copies of the
award and the agreement under which it was made, translated if
necessary. He need not prove that the award is final or binding where it
was made, or make any other affirmative showing of any kind.
Enforcement will be denied only if the losing party meets the burden of
showing defects in the award or in the processes leading up to it, or if
the court finds that the dispute was not arbitrable, or that enforcement
would violate its public policy.
Articles III and IV thus require the contracting states to have
reasonably straightforward procedures for enforcement. The procedure
in each country need not be identical with that applied to domestic
awards, but may not be "substantially more onerous." On the other
hand, it is not enough merely not to discriminate against foreign
awards. It is clear that the references to the enforcing forum's own
"rules of procedure" and to its "public policy" do not give it any basis
to nullify the basic obligation to have straightforward procedures for
enforcement of foreign awards.
3. Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement
As has been pointed out, a jurisdiction can refuse enforcement of
an award on limited public policy grounds, or if it considers the subject
matter involved not arbitrable. Otherwise, enforcement can be refused
if the opponent of enforcement pleads and proves any one of the
following:
(1) That the agreement to arbitrate is invalid. This determination
is generally made under the law by which the parties have agreed to be
governed; or, if they have not agreed, under the law of the place where
the award was made. Here, the parties are given explicit autonomy to
choose the law by which their agreement is to be judged, and only the
question of the parties' capacity to contract need be decided pursuant
to normal conflict of laws rules.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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(2) That the matter decided in the arbitration goes beyond the
scope of what the parties agreed to arbitrate. No choice of law principle
is stated here, but it seems clear that a court should allow the parties'
choice of law to govern, as with respect to the related matter of the
validity of the arbitration clause itself.
(3) That the arbitration was not conducted properly. Two
subsections of Article V cover this: one relating to notice of the
arbitration and the ability of the losing party to present his case, and
the other relating to the composition of the arbitral body and the
procedure followed by it. As to the second, the agreement of the
parties governs; they may thus either refer to the law of a chosen
jurisdiction or make up their own rules of procedure if they are not
illegal under the otherwise applicable law. If there is no agreement on
this subject, the law of the place of arbitration governs. The first
subsection, relating to notice and ability to participate, states no choice
of law rules. The parties should be able to make their own rules on this
as on other matters of procedure, subject to the public policy of any
enforcing jurisdiction as to basic due process, but the applicable rule
remains a question for the courts.
(4) The last in this category of defenses to be pleaded and proved
by the opponent is the defense that the award "has not yet become
binding on the parties," or has been set aside either in the country
where the award was made or in the country under whose law the
arbitration took place. Article VI further provides that if such a
proceeding to set aside the award is pending in either of those other
jurisdictions, the court asked to enforce the award may defer action
upon the giving of proper security. The meaning of the phrase "has not
yet become binding" is nowhere specified; the one thing that is clear is
that it means something less than "finality" and in particular does not
permit the losing party to insist on reduction of the award to judgment
in the country where the award is rendered. It is likely that a provision
in the agreement between the parties that any arbitral award would be
binding when rendered would guard against any possible defense of this
nature in an enforcement proceeding.
There is no limitation on the grounds on which the state where the
award is made or the state under whose law is made (as distinguished
from a third state where enforcement is sought) can set aside an award.
4. Recognition of Agreements to Arbitrate
Article II is the portion of the Convention relating to agreements
to arbitrate as distinguished from awards already made. It states that
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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each party "shall recognize an (arbitration) agreement in writing,"
provided that it concerns "a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration." It goes on to provide specifically that in any litigation
concerning a matter that is covered by an arbitration agreement, a court
"shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed." This Article is not up to
the standard of relative precision that characterizes the rest of the
convention, in several respects:
First, the scope of the agreements covered by Article II is not
clear. The statement of the scope of the Convention in Article I talks
specifically of "awards" and not of agreements to arbitrate, with the
exception of the provision for a reservation limiting coverage to
commercial matters, which is more generally stated and appears to
apply here. In fact, with the exception of the limitation to commercial
matters, there seems to be no easy or sensible way to relate the
coverage of this Article very precisely to the award coverage. Perhaps
the best principle to be applied is that the Article covers any agreement
where there is international diversity of citizenship or residence, since
any such agreement could lead to an award-enforcement problem.
The second ambiguity in Article II relates to what, if anything, a
state is required to do, by way of granting the "recognition" of an
agreement specified in Article 11(1), other than to respond to a lawsuit
brought by one of the parties with a referral to arbitration, as specified
in Article 11(3). There is no provision that "recognition" includes
specific performance in the form of a direction to arbitrate apart from a
lawsuit begun on a dispute. But a party seeking enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute might begin a lawsuit on that dispute
and then ask the court to refer it to arbitration under Article 11(3). The
apparent availability of such a rather strange procedure suggests that
''recognition" should perhaps be read to include straightforward
specific performance.
Finally, unlike Article V with respect to awards, Article II gives no
guidance with respect to the law to be applied in determining the
validity of the agreement sought to be enforced. In the award-enforcement context this question (except as to capacity) is decided under the
law chosen by the parties. It can be hoped that courts will similarly
respect the autonomy of the parties in enforcing agreements to
arbitrate, but there is no ground for certainty that they will.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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II. Benefits of the Convention
Assuming that the parties to an international business contract
within the scope of the Convention wish the maximum freedom in
agreeing on an arbitration clause that is certain to be effective, what
will the regime established by a general acceptance of the United
Nations Convention offer them?
First, they can be sure that if their agreement to arbitrate is valid
as a contract, and covers matters that are arbitrable under the laws of
the countries involved in their transactions, it will be honored in those
countries, at least to the extent that the courts will decline to entertain
competing litigation. There is a fair chance that any country having
jurisdiction will compel a recalcitrant party to go to arbitration. With
respect to such enforcement of their agreement, they cannot count on
choosing the law that will govern, but they can be sure that they will
not be confronted with outright hostility to arbitration or unduly
complex procedures.
Second, the parties to the contract can go a long way toward
establishing in advance the rules that will govern the arbitration itself.
They can, of course, specify the substantive law that the arbitrators will
follow, and no court will retry the substance of the dispute after an
award is made by the arbitrators. They can choose the place of
arbitration and the procedural rules to govern such matters as the
composition of the arbitral panel and the manner in which the
arbitration is to be conducted. They also have significant liberty to
choose the law to govern any proceeding to enforce the award. The
Convention does not, however, give the parties absolute freedom to
make their own law: they must allow for the possibility that the
capacity of the parties to contract, the scope of the matters submitted
to arbitration, the arbitrability of any dispute and the basic due process
of the proceeding will be assessed under its own law by any state where
enforcement of the award may be sought. And the award may be
refused enforcement on general public policy grounds. Thus, in agreeing
upon procedure and substantive law, the parties must still give heed to
the basic general principles of arbitration in each jurisdiction where
enforcement of an award may be desired.
Third, the parties can be sure that any arbitration award will be
readily enforced, without discrimination, in any jurisdiction where it
meets the general qualifications just stated. While the Convention does
not govern enforcement in the place where the award is made (assuming
it is considered as "domestic" there), the parties are, of course, free to
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2

UN Convention on Recognition of ArbitralAwards

327

choose a place of arbitration where domestic awards are readily
enforced.
III. United States Implementation Of The Convention
The principal obstacle to ratification that the delegation to the
1958 Conference saw was a difficulty in fitting it into existing United
States law. Many states do not treat arbitration agreements as
enforceable, and the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (Title 9,U.S.C)
has somewhat limited coverage both substantively and jurisdictionally.
Accordingly, it was felt in 1958 that the United States did not have an
adequate legislative basis to carry out the obligations it would be
undertaking in signing the Convention. Especially in the context of
then existing Bricker Amendment problems, it was considered inadvisable to attempt to ratify the treaty on the basis that it would be treated
as self-executing.
The government still considers that it would be inappropriate to
accede to the Convention on a self-executing basis, and this association
has agreed. However, the fear existing in 1958 that joining the
Convention, even with appropriate federal implementing legislation,
would be an excessive intrusion into matters of state concern has been
largely dissipated by further development of federal arbitration law in
the interim. It is now well established by such decisions as those in
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,Inc. in the Second Circuit 6

and the Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), that the Federal Act establishes as federal substantive law the
proposition that agreements to arbitrate within its scope are valid,
irrevocable and enforceable. Prima Paint also goes far toward expanding
the arbitrators' jurisdiction at the expense of the courts, and thus in
effect allowing the arbitrators to decide virtually all legal questions
without judicial review. Thus, the federal-state problems seem less
extreme now than they did previously, and judicial distrust of
arbitration generally has substantially subsided. Therefore, while
legislation is still considered a necessary prerequisite to United States
accession, it now appears more readily acceptable.
Implementing legislation, in the form of amendments to the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, is being prepared in the government
and will be submitted to the Congress after the Senate consents to
accession to the Convention.
6 271 F.2d 402 (2d. Cir. 1959), cert granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismissed, 364 U.S. 801

(1960).
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Some Questions and Suggestions
The major effect of the legislation upon state law would be what is
in effect a prohibition against state litigation of any dispute covered by
the Convention that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.
The Federal Arbitration Act provides only (in § 3) that such litigation
in avoidance of arbitration cannot be conducted in the federal courts. It
is contemplated that this aspect of the Convention will be implemented
by a simple provision that any action begun on a dispute arbitrable
under the Convention may be removed to a federal court, which will
then issue the appropriate stay. Along this same line, it is also
contemplated that the implementing statute would establish federalquestion jurisdiction over all cases relating to rights under the
Convention, without regard to jurisdictional amount, thereby eliminating the problem that the existing statute requires independent federal
jurisdiction for any action to enforce an arbitration clause.
Other changes are required in the procedural provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act. With respect to enforcement of awards,
section 9 of the Act provides that, unless the parties have specified an
enforcing court, enforcement is available only in the district where the
award was made, and must be given there unless the award has been set
aside pursuant to section 10 in the district where it was made. Foreign
awards have, therefore, frequently been enforceable only in common
law actions, which may be somewhat cumbersome. Section 9 would be
amended so as to provide that an award made abroad subject to the
Convention could be enforced in any district court with appropriate
jurisdiction over the person sought to be held or his property. Similarly,
any such district court would be given autlority to refuse enforcement
-if the award is made abroad and is covered by the Convention-on any
of the grounds specified in the Convention.
A further change that seems to be desirable would be an
amendment of Section 4 of the Act to empower a United States court
to order arbitration abroad. Section 4 as it now reads permits
arbitration to be ordered only in the court's own district-which can
result in a substantial departure from the parties' original desire.
Although tfle Convention does not expressly require any such specific
performance of an agreement to arbitrate, the writer thinks it should be
so interpreted.
One matter that requires further consideration is the requirements
of personal jurisdiction and venue that should be applied to suits to
enforce foreign awards and to direct arbitration abroad. Should the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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party seeking enforcement be required to sue in a jurisdiction where the
defendant can be found, or should he be able to have nationwide
service of process-or even possibly worldwide service if the defendant
is doing business in the United States? The latter seems a desirable
approach.
Finally, a major question remains as to what, if anything, should
be done in the implementing legislation to tailor the scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act to that of the Convention. The coverage of the
Act is limited to "maritime transactions" and "contracts evidencing
transactions involving commerce." The former category, in the area of
international transactions, is further defined quite broadly as including
"matters in foreign commerce which ... would be embraced within
admiralty jurisdiction." "Commerce" is defined as "commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations," but there is an explicit
exception for "contracts of employment ...

of workers."

The scope of the formula-"transaction involving commerce"-presents some problems, and its meaning has not been definitively
established in the courts. In its Prima Paint decision in 1967, a majority
of the Supreme Court rejected the argument of three dissenters that
such "commerce" means only "contracts between merchants for the
interstate shipment of goods," and held that it covered a consulting
contract relating to the sale of a business in interstate commerce which
would involve movement of its operations from one state to another.
But the Court did not have to consider the further possible ramifications of "commerce," particularly in the international context. It is not
yet established that "commerce" in the Act is as broad as "commerce"
in the Constitution (although Prima Paint points strongly that way),
and one cannot ignore altogether lower court decisions which have
limited the Act's coverage quite stringently in both the domestic and
international areas.7 Although there is substantial contrary authority,'
it remains true that our Act does not beyond doubt cover all
transactions involved in the international business of Americans as
ordinarily understood.
The decision has been definitely made that the United States
should, in acceding to the Convention, make the permitted reservation
limiting its application to "relationships ... considered as commercial"
7 E.g., McDonough Constr. Co. v. Hanner, 232 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C. 1964); The
Volsinio, 32 F.2d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)
8 E.g., Reynolds Jamaica Mines v. La Societe Navale Caennaise, 239 F.2d 689 (4th Cir.
1956); International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 93 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md.
1950).
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under our national law. The President has formally transmitted the
Convention to the Senate on that basis, with the explanation that the
reservation "would be consistent with the policy expressed" in the
Federal Arbitration Act. It would indeed be somewhat anomalous if the
United States were to enforce arbitration with a foreign element
significantly more broadly than it enforces domestic arbitration. The
problem remains, however, of defining what is the meaning of
'commercial matters" in this context under United States law.
It is the personal feeling of the writer that it would be most logical
to define the United States reservation to the Convention in terms of
the existing Federal Arbitration Act, with the resulting coverage
including both maritime transactions and "transactions involving commerce" as defined therein. In the process, pains should be taken to
make it clear that, for this purpose at least, the fact that a contract is
wholly performed outside the United States does not destroy its
involvement in commerce if the parties are of diverse nationalities and
there is substantial contact with the United States. This could be
accomplished by an explicit statement in the document effecting
United States accession or as a part of the legislative history of the
Senate advice and consent. It might, however, be preferable to amend
the definition of "commerce" in section 1 of the Act to make this
explicit there. It is certainly desirable to define from the beginning,
with all feasible precision based on as much practical knowledge as is
available, what the scope of the United States accession is.
There remains one further question as to the scope the Convention
should have in the United States. It appears to have been understood
among the draftsmen of the Convention that a state could decline to
have the Convention apply to disputes between two of its own citizens.
The United States in acceding, should make a statement to this effect;
otherwise, two residents of the same state within the United States
could probably avoid the law of their state with respect to a contract
involving interstate commerce merely by providing for arbitration
abroad. A treaty permitting them to do so would be an unnecessary and
undesirable irritant to the states. Similarly, the arbitration of disputes
even between residents of different states of the United States should
probably be regarded as a domestic matter-to be governed by the general
federal arbitration law unaffected by any treaty-even if international
transactions are involved and they agree on arbitration abroad.
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Conclusion
Although the United Nations Convention on Arbitration is a very
substantial stride forward, it does not reach the end of the road as a
great many people see it. It might well be desirable to go on even
further in the future toward an international regime of arbitration
governed more broadly by the autonomous will of the parties and less
tied to national law. Perhaps also an ideal regime would cover subject
matter broader than what would be encompassed in the proposed
United States accession to the Convention. However, the Convention
goes about as far as the United States can go, consistent with the
principles of arbitration now accepted in our law. Further steps in
international recognition of arbitral agreements and awards can be taken
only in harmony with further steps along the same line in our domestic
law.
This is an area where the American Bar Association and other
interested private organizations should continue to play a major role in
studying the problems involved and initiating action to resolve them.
Arbitration of private disputes is obviously an area where no one in the
Government is like to have the comprehensive knowledge and practical
experience of those in the private sector who work in the area day by
day. It is also an important truth that it is hard for responsible people
in the Government to find the time to focus upon problems of such
theoretical and practical complexity. In such areas of primarily private
concern, .private interests must take upon themselves the burden not
only of urging governmental action in general terms, but also of
providing detailed analysis and advice to those in the Government who
are in a position to act.
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